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Is Managed Care Still An Effective Cost Containment Device?*







In this paper we take a historical perspective to examine the effects of managed care growth and 
hospital competition on hospital cost and revenue growth during managed care’s boom period 
(1990-1994), its mature period (1994-1998), and its backlash period (1998-2003).  We find that 
while higher managed care presence was indeed effective in slowing down hospital cost and 
revenue growth during the boom and the mature periods, it lost its cost containment effect during 
the backlash period.  This result persists under different estimation methods designed to reduce 
biases that might result from omitted variable bias and measurement errors.  On the other hand, 
competition effects appear to persist throughout the three periods.  However, such persistent 
competition effects were initially the result of aggressive selective contracting in the high 
managed care markets, but were later dominated by the less saturated, but growing, managed 
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The managed care industry enjoyed a period of rapid growth in the early 1990s (Figure 1).  
The explosion of growth was fueled by concerns of rising health care cost during that period.  
Managed care plans had traditionally adopted strategies that allowed them to aggressively 
control health care costs, including the use of primary care gatekeepers, negotiating deep 
discounts with providers, and restricting access to providers outside of the network (Bamezai et 
al 1999; Draper et al 2002).  However, such aggressive strategies created a deep mistrust in 
consumers in the later part of the 1990s (Swartz 1999, Robinson 2001).  The negative portrayals 
of managed care plans in the media further created a chasm between managed care and 
consumers/providers, even when a consumer might not have felt dissatisfied with his or her own 
health plan (Blendon et al. 1998).  Several studies found that managed care plans, in order to 
retain customers and to mitigate negative media exposure, had relaxed their many once 
restrictive network requirements and deep discounting (Draper et al 2002; Mays et al 2003, 2004; 
Marquis et al 2005).  At the same time, consolidation had increased the hospital’s market power 
in local provider markets (Cuellar and Gertler 2003, 2005).  Such movement in the provider 
markets may have further eroded managed care’s ability to slow down the growth of health care 
cost.  
Since its peak enrollment in 1998, managed care plans (especially health maintenance 
organizations, HMOs) in the private sector have experienced a steady decline in enrollment.1 
During the same period, the Medicare+Choice program also had trouble retaining customers 
after enjoying a healthy expansion for most of the 1990’s (Gold 2003), although the federal 
government still looked to managed care as a  way to control Medicare costs.  Contrary to the 
                                                 
1 Based on author’s tabulation of Interstudy data. 
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decline in private and Medicare enrollment, state and local governments, in the hopes of easing 
program costs, increasingly put their Medicaid enrollees into managed care plans. (see, for 
example, Figure 1 in Marquis et al 2005, for the historical trend in HMO penetration).   The 
continuing trend to less capitation and less restrictive practices by managed care plans, and the 
strengthening of the hospital’s market power have left researchers and policymakers to ponder 
whether managed care can help achieve cost containment goals after the backlash in late 1990s.     
In our paper, we take a historical perspective to examine the effects of managed care 
growth and competition in the hospital market on hospital financial performance during managed 
care’s boom period (1990-1994), its mature period (1994-1998), and the backlash period (1998-
2003).  As discussed in more detail below, we extend the previous literature in several ways.  
First, unlike previous studies that focused on just HMOs, we examine growth in system-wide 
managed care that includes both HMO and PPO (preferred provider organizations).  Second, our 
panel data allows us to examine the cost containment effect after the start of the backlash.  Third, 
we implement empirical strategies to treat the potential endogeneity problem that might exist 
between managed care growth and hospital cost and revenue growth.   Lastly, we estimate 
interaction effects between the managed care effect and the competition effect.  This approach 
allows us to identify the potential differential competition effects in areas that experienced 
different rates of managed care growth. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  We discuss the background literature in 
section 2.  We present the methodology and data sources in section 3, including details on how 
the key variables are constructed and other estimation issues.  We present the main results as 




The rise of the managed care industry has been credited for slowing down the cost 
escalation in the health care industry at least during the first half of the 1990’s (Congressional 
Budget Office 1995; Miller and Luft 1997; Miller and Luft 2002; Glied 2000).  There are 
generally two types of research examining how managed care shapes the US health care market: 
one type treats managed care plans as sellers in the insurance market while the other views 
managed care plans as buyers in the provider market.  In the former category, most of the studies 
focusing on the effect of different managed care plan types on utilization and costs, have found 
that HMO plans have lower expenditure than FFS plans (Newhouse 1993; Cutler et al. 2000). 
However, more recent literature indicates that managed care premiums were on the rise after the 
backlash and economic slowdown in the early 2000s and that health plans were shifting costs to 
consumers (Gold 2003, Mays et al 2004).  
In the second type of study, researchers are concerned with the level of managed care 
penetration in the provider markets (and how it affects provider prices, revenues, and costs).  
One way that health plans can lower their operating costs and control premium increases is to 
stimulate price competition amongst providers in order to negotiate lower prices as part of the 
selective contracting process.  Such a process would result in reduced revenue for hospitals, but 
at the same time encourage efficiency as hospitals are forced to operate at reduced cost.  Our 
study falls into this category and aims to quantify hospitals’ financial performance during 
different phases of the managed care evolution. 
Morrisey (2001) reviewed the empirical literature on the effects of selective contracting 
and hospital competition on various aspects of hospital performance such as prices, travel 
distance, services, and quality.  In general, previous studies that examined the effect of managed 
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care growth on hospital cost growth before the backlash have consistently found that HMO 
growth lowered hospital cost inflation (Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Connor et al 1998; Bamezai et 
al 1999; Shen and Melnick 2004) and that increased HMO buying power was associated with 
lower prices of hospital services (Feldman and Wholey 2001).  However, there was no empirical 
evidence indicating whether such cost containment effect had continued after the start of the 
purported backlash period. 
Hospital market power can alleviate the financial pressure exerted by the managed care 
plans.  Previous studies have found that increased hospital market concentration is associated 
with hospitals charging higher prices (Melnick et al 1992; Zwanziger et al 2000; Morrisey 2001; 
Town and Vistnes 2001).  This market power effect continues in the backlash period in two 
studies that examined the negotiated prices managed care plans obtained after hospital mergers 
(Zwanziger and 2005, Capps and Dranove 2004).  A few studies explicitly examined the 
interactive effects between hospital competition and managed care:  Connor et al (1998) and 
Bamezai et al (1999) both found that the ability of managed care plans to contain cost and 
revenue growth was substantially limited when the hospital market was highly concentrated.  
Whether the reduced ability to contain cost in the presence of provider market power was 
exacerbated after the backlash started remains to be tested. 
   
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Data were drawn from a variety of sources.  Hospital data primarily came from Medicare 
hospital cost reports and the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys.  Together, 
they provided detailed information on hospitals’ financial performance, inpatient and outpatient 
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utilization, and other characteristics.  Managed care penetration data were obtained primarily 
from Interstudy.2   In our main analysis, we used total system-wide managed care penetration 
rates, which included enrollment in commercial HMOs, Medicaid HMOs, Medicare HMOs, and 
PPO enrollment.  We further supplemented this dataset with the area wage index, the Area 
Resource File, the County Business Patterns, and the PPS Impact file as well as other MSA 
characteristics such as per capita income and population size.3     
 
3.2 Empirical Methods 
We examine changes in costs and revenues at the hospital level among all short-term, 
general, non-federal hospitals located in MSAs in the United States between 1990 and 2003.  We 
focus on growth in three periods:  the boom period (1990-1994), the mature period (1994-1998), 
and the backlash period (1998-2003).   The unit of observation is the hospital, and we use a 
hospital fixed-effects model to remove bias that might result from time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity across hospital markets.   
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total operating cost for the cost regression and 
the logarithm of net patient revenue for the revenue regression.  We use the standard translog 
function to account for the highly skewed distributions of cost and revenue.  In our main analysis, 
we implement three estimation models, each varies by the managed care measures.  The general 
equation for all three models is as follows: 
ittittitititittiit CHXIPOLnE εγγββγα ++++= )*,*,()),,(ln(   (1) 
                                                 
2 All 4 years of HMO data were collected by Interstudy.  We thank Dr. Doug Wholey for providing the pro-rating 
HMO enrollment at the county level for 1990 and 1994 (Wholey et al 1997).  We aggregate the county-level 
enrollment to MSA level.  The 1990 and 1994 PPO data were collected by SMG Marketing, Inc. We thank Dr. Jack 
Zwanziger for providing these data at the MSA level.  PPO data were not available for 1998 but were available for 
2000, therefore we interpolate the 1998 PPO enrollment using 1994 and 2000 numbers. 
3 Information from Area Resource File (population size and per capita income) were at the county levels.  We 
aggregate these to MSA levels. 
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Where 
E=annual operating costs or net patient revenue  
iα =hospital fixed-effects for each hospital i 
tγ =year dummies for each of 4 years, t, between and including 1990-2003 
O=hospital output (total inpatient discharges, casemix, total outpatient visits; all log 
transformed) 
P=input prices (proxy by relative wage index, log transformed) 
I=demand for hospital care (proxy by log per capita income)  
X=hospital and market characteristics4 (hospital ownership, hospital system membership, 
financial pressure index from Medicaid and Medicare as defined below, percent for-profit 
and government hospitals in a market). 
C=Herfindahl index of the hospital market based on patient flow, log transformed (more in 
the next section). 
H=managed care penetration.  In Model 1, this is the actual managed care penetration rate in 
each year, log transformed.  In Model 2, this represents the instrumented managed care 
penetration rate (log transformed), where historical managed care penetration rates  were 
used to instrument for changes in managed care penetration rates over this period. In Model 3, 
this set represents indicators for hospitals in low, medium, and high levels of managed care 
penetration rates (low rate is the omitted group).  More details on these managed care 
measures below. 
 
We also include quadratics of hospital input prices and output in our model to capture possible 
                                                 
4 Market is defined as an area within a 15-mile radius from the given hospital’s zip code location (Luft and Maerki 
1984; Phibbs and Robinson 1993). 
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nonlinear relationships between these variables and costs and revenues.  The year dummies 
effectively capture the average growth rates for hospitals over this period in Models 1 and 2, and 
the annual growth rates for hospitals in MSAs with low managed care penetration level in Model 
3.   
The key variables of interest are the interaction terms between year dummies and the 
managed care measures, and between year dummies and the competition measures.  The first set 
of interaction terms captures whether hospitals in markets with higher managed care penetration 
experienced differential growth rates in cost and revenue than those in markets with low 
managed care penetration across 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2003.  The second set of interaction 
terms captures whether hospitals in more competitive markets experienced differential growth 
rates in cost and revenue than those in less competitive markets over those years.  In addition, in 
Model 3 we include the three-way interactions between year dummies, managed care measures, 
and competition measures to capture possible differential competition effects across different 
levels of managed care markets.   
 
3.3 Measures of Managed Care Penetration and Growth 
 Our managed care measurement captures system-wide managed care penetration that 
includes commercial HMO, Medicaid and Medicare HMO, and PPO.  We believe the system-
wide measurement better captures the bargaining power health plans might have with the 
providers, as many insurers offer both HMO and PPO products in the same market (AMA 2004), 
and many HMOs couple their products with PPO network.  Furthermore, the distinction between 
HMOs and PPOs is also getting blurred as many HMOs have eliminated physician gatekeepers 
and have offered broader networks (Draper et al 2002).  One problem with using the system-
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wide managed care penetration is that PPO covered lives is measured with substantial error.5  
We partially offset this problem in Model 3 using categorical variables.  In addition, in our 
sensitivity analysis, we estimate our model using only the HMO measures. 
Ideally, when we want to investigate the relationship between changes in managed care 
penetration and changes in hospitals’ cost and revenue growth, we would regress changes in 
hospital cost on the change in managed care penetration.  However, there might be unobserved 
market factors that simultaneously influence the managed care penetration rate and hospital cost 
and revenue across the markets.  We address this problem by using a hospital fixed-effects model.  
This fixed-effects translog model has been used extensively in previous studies (Granneman et al. 
1986; Bamezai, et al. 1999; Zwanziger, et al. 2000).  To the extent that the unobserved 
characteristics in the provider market remain stable over time, the hospital fixed-effects model 
would eliminate this potential selection bias.  We present results from this specification in Model 
1. 
There is a concern that managed care plans selectively enter markets where they think 
they will have the greatest effect, and as such, growth in managed care and changes in hospital 
costs and revenues are endogenously related.   To the extent that the endogenous relationship 
across markets is stable over time, the fixed-effects model would be sufficient.  While there is a 
consensus that cross-market variations between the managed care penetration level and the 
hospital cost level are endogenously related, it is not clear whether the growth variation between 
the two measures suffers the same estimation problem.  To investigate whether our results are 
sensitive to this assumption, we estimate Model 2 by instrumenting for managed care growth.  It 
should be noted that while several labor market characteristics have been used in the literature as 
instruments for managed care penetration (Baker 1997, Dranove et al 2002), those instruments 
                                                 
5 Based on personal communication with Interstudy representative. 
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were aimed to capture cross-sectional variation in managed care and not growth variation.  In 
our model, we select historical HMO penetration rates as the instruments for current period 
growth.6  The idea is that historical penetration rates are good predictors of current growth rates 
(if an area already has high managed care enrollment, it is less likely to grow as fast as an area 
with low managed care enrollment).  But the historical penetration rate is unlikely to influence 
hospital cost growth during the current period.  In an alternative specification, we use historical 
growth rate (HMO penetration growth between 1987 and 1989) to instrument for the growth rate 
in the current period.  We obtain very similar results.  
The instrumented managed care measure is constructed using the following steps.  In 
Step 1, we estimate the base-year (1990) penetration level using historical HMO penetration 
rates (1987) and several labor market characteristics in the base year to capture demand for 
health plans, such as the unemployment rate, the percent of white collar workers, the percent of 
workers in manufacturing, the percent of workers in construction, the percent of self-employed 
workers, and physicians per capita.  The predicted value from this regression forms the base of 
our instrumented managed care measure.   In Step 2, we predict the growth rate between 1990 
and 1994 using the historical HMO penetration rates and all the other exogenous variables in our 
model; we do the same for 1990-1998 and 1990-2003 growth rates.  In Step 3, we add the 
predicted growth rate from Step 2 to the predicted base-year penetration rate from Step 1 to 
generate the penetration rate for the other 3 years.  This “hypothetical” managed care measure 
then becomes the instrument for the actual managed care penetration in the second stage. 
One estimation problem with using self-reported managed care measures is that it is 
measured with substantial error.  This is particularly problematic to estimation precision when 
                                                 
6 We used 1987 HMO penetration rates as the instrument for growth.  Historical PPO penetration is not available to 
us. 
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we add additional 3-way interaction terms between managed care, competition, and year 
dummies.  In Model 3, instead of using the actual penetration rate in the model, we group 
hospitals into MSAs with low, medium, and high managed care penetration levels.  We do the 
same with respect to competition measures.  We then interact these two sets of categorical 
measures with year dummies to capture potential differential effects of competition across 
markets with different levels of managed care growth.  This approach can reduce bias that might 
result from measurement errors (Greene 1997) and increase precision of our estimates.  Another 
benefit of using the categorical variable is that we can interpret the results easily.   
  
3.4 Other Variable Construction 
Dependent Variables:  Hospital Cost and Revenue 
In our analysis we focus on annual total operating costs and net patient revenue7, because 
health plans will have a more direct effect on operations than on non-operating activities such as 
income from investments.8
 
Measure of Hospital Competition 
 We construct a hospital-level Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for each year using the 
1990-2002 Medicare discharge data extracted from the MEDPAR file.  We define hospital 
markets using actual zip code level patient flow data.  The method is described in more detail in 
Bamezai et al. (1999).  We broadly outline the five-step approach here.  First, all DRGs are 
categorized into 48 separate service categories based on the type of physician that typically treats 
                                                 
7 Net patient revenue is total patient revenue minus contractual allowances and discounts on patients’ accounts.  
Both net and total patient revenues are reported in the Medicare hospital cost reports. 
8 Using total cost and total revenue yield very similar results, since operating cost and patient revenue are the major 
components of total cost and revenue.  
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a patient in a given DRG.  Second, the hospital’s market area for each service is defined using 
patient origin data.  Third, competing hospitals are identified on a zip code level as those 
facilities that draw at least 3 percent of a zip code area’s total discharges for a given service.  
Fourth, an HHI is calculated for each zip code area’s service combination.  Finally, the degree of 
competition facing each hospital is captured by estimating a weighted average of the zip code 
area’s service HHIs in its market, with the proportion of patients it draws from each zip code 
area service combination serving as the weight. Though this measure is based on Medicare 
patients only, previously, a comparative correlation analysis was done using data from several 
states with all payor data, and the two HHI measures were highly correlated (Bamezai et al 1999).   
 
Medicaid and Medicare Financial Pressure 
 The study covers periods in which Medicare underwent several major transitions in the 
payments for  general acute hospitals.  Most hospitals transitioned from a cost-based system to a 
prospective payment system by 1990.  The early 1990s saw several changes in the blends for 
teaching and disproportionate share payments.  In 1998, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) 
implemented uniform rate cuts across all general acute hospitals.   To capture the effect of the 
financial pressure from Medicare, we construct a Medicare fiscal pressure index.  The Medicare 
fiscal pressure is the ratio between the PPS payment a hospital receives for a Medicare discharge 
(weighted by a hospital’s Medicare share of patients), relative to the national median PPS 
payment.  If a hospital has an index above 1, it receives a more generous payment compared to 
the median hospital in the sample.  If a hospital’s Medicare financial pressure index is below 1, 
then it receives a more stringent payment than the median hospital in the sample.  It should be 
noted that the Medicare financial pressure measure captures only changes in average payment 
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due to exogenous change in the reimbursement formula.  In other words, the index is based not 
on what the hospitals actually receive but rather what the hospitals would have received if they 
did not change behaviors at all in response to the changing reimbursement policies from 
Medicare (Shen 2003, Wu 2005).9
 The Medicaid financial pressure index was constructed to measure the degree to which 
the change in Medicaid policies across states and over time had affected hospital’s financial 
operation.  We use the state-level Medicaid physician fee index from Norton and Zuckerman 
(2000) and the follow-up study by Lewin Group (2003) as the Medicaid financial pressure index.  
The index is the ratio between each state’s physician fee schedule for primary care to the median 
physician fee of the nation.  If a state has an index above 1, it is a more generous state compare 
to the rest of the nation.  If a state’s Medicaid financial pressure index is below 1, then it pays its 
physicians less than the median state. 
 
4. Results 
 We start by looking at the trend in managed care penetration and hospital cost/revenue 
over the study period.  Figure 1 shows the managed care penetration in the four years: 1990, 
1994, 1998, and 2003.  HMOs grew from 10 percent penetration in 1990 to 24 percent in 1998.  
The enrollment dropped to 18 percent in 2003.  PPOs grew from 23 percent in 1990 to 34 
percent of the MSA population in 2003.   Overall, managed care penetration (as defined by HMO 
+ PPO) grew from 33 percent of the MSA population in 1990 to 58 percent of the MSA 
population when it reached the peak in 1998, and the growing trend stopped after 1998. 
                                                 
9 We would like to thank Vivian Wu for providing the financial pressure measure for payment changes due to BBA 
1997.  The financial pressure measures for 1990-1994 were obtained from Shen (2003).  The payment change 
between 1994 and 1998 was approximated by the growth rate in updating factor obtained from March 2003 MedPac 
Report. 
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 Figures 2A and 2B shows the unadjusted trend operating cost and patient revenue (in log 
transformation), respectively, for 4 groups of hospitals:  hospitals in low managed care/low HHI 
(i.e., highly competitive) markets; hospitals in low managed care/high HHI markets; hospitals in 
high managed care/low HHI markets; and hospitals in high managed care/high HHI markets.  
Hospitals are classified as being in high managed care MSAs if the managed care penetration in 
that MSA belongs to the top 2 quintiles of the managed care penetration distribution in that year, 
likewise for hospitals that are classified in high HHI markets.  Both figures show similar patterns.  
Take Figure 2A for example, although hospitals in low HHI (more competitive) markets started 
out having higher operating cost than those in high HHI (less competitive) markets in 1990, they 
clearly had slower cost growth in subsequent years, regardless of whether they are in low or high 
managed care markets.  By the end of the study period, those hospitals in more competitive 
markets had lower cost than those in less competitive markets.  Among hospitals in low HHI 
markets (the long dashed and short dashed lines), the effect of managed care appears to be most 
pronounced during the 1990-1994 period where the hospitals in high managed care areas had 
much slower growth rates than those in low managed care areas.  The cost trends appear to be 
similar between the two categories after 1994.  The pattern is different among hospitals in high 
HHI markets (comparing the solid and dotted lines), where hospitals in high managed care areas 
appear to have faster growth rate than those in low managed care areas between 1990 and 1998.  
But after 1998, the growth rate is slower in high managed care areas.   
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in our regression 
model by years.  The top panel provides information on hospitals in high managed care areas and 
the bottom panel on hospitals in low managed care areas.  In general, hospitals in high managed 
care areas are more competitive (HHI ranges from 0.26 to 0.29) than those in low managed care 
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areas (HHI ranges from 0.33 to 0.40).  They are also more likely to locate in markets with higher 
labor cost and higher income—their wage indexes and per capita income are all higher than 
those hospitals in low managed care areas across the 4 years.  Hospitals in high managed care 
areas on average receive higher Medicare payments, but tend to be in states with more stringent 
Medicaid payment policies.  System membership increases substantially over this period such 
that by 2003, 80 percent of all hospitals belong to a system regardless of the managed care levels. 
 Cost Regression Results.  Table 2 reports the fixed-effects regression results on 
operating cost.  We present the full regression results in Table 2, but focus our discussion on the 
key variables in the text.  As discussed in the method section, the managed care effects in Model 
1 are estimated using the actual managed care penetration rate in each year.  The main effect of 
managed care captures any cost differences due to managed care penetration in the base year.  
The coefficient indicates that there is no difference in 1990.  The interaction terms between 
managed care measure and year dummies indicate that by 1994, a 1 percent increase in managed 
care penetration is associated with slower cost growth by 0.27 of one percentage point.  The gap 
widens further in 1998, where a 1 percent increase in managed care is associated with almost 1 
percentage point reduction in cost growth.  However, by 2003, the cost growth differences 
disappear, indicating that managed care no longer slows down cost growth as in the previous 
periods.  The competition effects are much stronger than the managed care effects, and follow a 
different pattern over the years.  In 1990, hospitals in less competitive markets (higher HHI) 
tended to have lower cost (0.65 percent).  However, by 1994 a 1 percent increase in HHI is 
associated with almost 1 percentage point growth in cost.  The faster growth among hospitals 
with more market power continues throughout the study period—the cost growth difference is 
1.7 and 2.4 percentage points for 1 additional percent of HHI in 1998 and 2004 relative to the 
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base year, respectively.  We do not present the 3-way interaction results for Model 1 because the 
standard errors become quite large for all variables due to multiple sets of interactions.  We will 
discuss the interaction results when we use categorical variables in Model 3. 
Model 2 replaces the actual managed care penetration with the instrumented managed 
care penetration as discussed in the methods section.  The instrumented penetration rate is a 
strong predictor of the actual penetration rate: the F-statistic from the first stage is 16.  The cost 
growth pattern is similar between Models 1 and 2, but the magnitude of the managed care effect 
is much stronger in Model 2.  This model suggests that the cost growth difference in 1998 is 2.28 
percentage point for each additional percent of managed care penetration. But both models 
support the backlash story: by 2003, the cost containment effect of managed care disappears.  
The coefficients on the competition measures remain stable and both models indicate that 
competition effects persist even by 2003. 
Model 3 uses categorical variables to capture low, medium, and high managed care 
markets.  We also replace the HHI measure with an indicator of high HHI markets (the indicator 
is 1 if hospitals belong to the top 2 quintiles of the HHI distribution).  We use this approach to 
reduce measurement errors.  The interpretation of the managed care and competition coefficients 
are different from Models 1 and 2, but all three models consistently support the backlash story.  
Because of the three-way interaction among managed care, HHI, and year indicators, the main 
effect of the high managed care indicator effectively captures the cost difference in 1990 
between hospitals in low and high managed care areas where hospital markets are competitive.  
The main effect of the high managed care indicator shows that hospitals in high managed care 
and low HHI markets started out, on average, 6 percent higher in cost than those in low managed 
care and low HHI markets.  However, the cost growth is kept at a much slower rate—by 1998, 
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hospital cost in high managed care areas increased  by 11 percentage points less than hospital 
cost in low managed care areas.  After the backlash and by 2003, however, there is no longer a 
cost growth gap between high and low managed care markets.  Hospitals in medium managed 
care markets follow a similar pattern as those in high managed care areas, but the magnitude of 
the managed care effect is smaller.  The competition and time dummy interactions effectively 
capture the growth rate in low managed care markets.  Without a high presence of managed care, 
the competition effects did not materialize until the last year, where hospitals with stronger 
market power experience a cost growth rate that is 15 percentage point higher than those in more 
competitive markets.  The three-way interaction terms show competition effects appear to differ 
between high and low managed care markets only during the initial period between 1990 and 
1994.  Conditional on being in high HHI markets, hospital cost in high managed care markets is 
7.4 percent below those in low managed care markets.  But these hospitals experienced a 
substantial growth between 1990 and 1994 such that their cost growth rate between 1990 and 
1994 is 7.5 percent higher than those hospitals in low managed care markets.  Such differential 
effects gradually disappear after the boom period. 
To visualize the managed care effects more easily, we show the regression adjusted 
operating cost in Figure 3A using Model 3 results.  The adjusted cost trend for high managed 
care markets is generated by assuming that all hospitals in the sample are located in high 
managed care markets.  We use the same method to generate cost trend for low managed care 
markets.   The graph shows that although high managed care areas are associated with higher 
cost level in the beginning of 1990, managed care was effective in keeping the growth rate low 
up until 1998 and hospital cost levels in high managed care markets were actually below those in 
low managed care markets in 1998.  But the growth rate picked up again after 1998. 
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Figure 4A shows the trend of competition effects separately for high and low managed 
care markets using Model 3 results.  In both low and high managed care markets, hospitals with 
more market power start out at a lower cost level than those in more competitive markets, but 
grow faster over the period such that they end up at a higher cost level by 2003.  For hospitals in 
high managed care markets, the growth gap is most pronounced during 1990-1994, while for 
hospitals in low managed car markets, the growth gap did not materialize until the 1998-2003 
period. 
Revenue Regression Results.  We also examine the revenue growth during the same 
period.  Full regression results for patient revenue are presented in Table 3, and the regression 
adjusted growth trend which captures the effect of managed care and competition are also 
presented in Figures 3B and 4B.  The revenue trends follow the same pattern as the cost trends 
and the managed care and competition coefficients are very similar between Tables 2 and 3.10  
While managed care and competition affects hospitals’ patient revenue streams, hospitals appear 
to be able to adjust their expenditure pattern in response to changes in those two market factors 
as well.  
Sensitivity Analysis.  The three models presented above paint a consistent story of 
managed care losing its cost containment effect during the backlash period (1998-2003).  We 
perform several sensitivity analyses to confirm this finding.  First, we experiment with several 
possible instruments, such as using the historical growth rate instead of the historical penetration 
levels and using historical penetration levels from different years.  These produced very similar 
results.  One concern with our managed care measure is that PPO enrollment, in particular, is 
measured with much more noise than HMO enrollment.  In one specification, we separate out 
                                                 
10 One noticeable difference between the cost and revenue regression is that the coefficients on Medicare pressure 
index were not significant in the cost regression, but were much larger and statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
across all 3 models in the revenue regression.  
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HMO and PPO penetration.  We obtain similar coefficients (magnitude and sign) on the HMO 
measure but we get larger standard errors.  The F-test of linear combination did not find the 
HMO and PPO coefficients to be statistically significantly different. Third, our imbalanced panel 
could be due to hospitals entering and exiting the markets or failure to report data throughout the 
period.  In one specification, we limit the samples to hospitals that have all 4 years of data 
available to us.  Although this step reduces sample size substantially, we find even stronger 
results on our key variables. 
 
5. Discussion 
The health care market has experienced several significant changes over the past 15 years. 
Providers have come under various pressures from the payer side, either through payment policy 
changes or the growing presence of the managed care industry.  Previous literature found that 
managed care plans (in particular HMOs) were effective in slowing down cost growth in the 
hospital sector.  However, in recent years, the managed care industry reversed their once 
restrictive management tools to mitigate a backlash related to negative media coverage and 
employers responding to employee dissatisfaction with restrictive forms of managed care.  In our 
study, we aimed to identify the effects of managed care and hospital competition during three 
distinctive periods (the boom years, the mature years, and the backlash years), taking into 
account changes in other aspects of the health care payment and delivery system. 
We find that while higher managed care presence was indeed effective in slowing down 
the hospital cost and revenue growth during the boom and the mature periods, it appears that 
managed care lost its power to restrain cost growth during the backlash period.  In fact, the rate 
of growth in costs among hospitals in higher managed care markets actually picked up at a faster 
 19
pace between 1998 and 2003.  This result persists under different estimation methods designed to 
reduce biases that might result from both unobserved factors that changed over time in the health 
care market and measurement errors.  On the other hand, the cost constraining effects of local 
market competition appear to persist throughout the three periods:  on average hospitals with 
more market power (higher HHIs) grew at a faster rate than those in more competitive markets.   
Our findings on the interactive effect between hospital competition and managed care 
penetration during the boom period (1990-1994) are consistent with previous findings in  
Bamezai et al (1999):  both studies find that in the boom period greater hospital competition is 
associated with greater cost containment effects in areas with high levels of managed care 
penetration and vice versa.  Although hospitals in more competitive markets continued to have 
lower cost growth than those with market power in the later period, the growth gap disappeared 
by 2003.  This result suggests that the selective contracting effect of managed care may be 
diminishing in saturated managed care areas during the backlash period.   
On the other hand, there appears to be little competition effect during the initial boom 
period for hospitals in the low managed care markets.  The small presence of managed care 
during the initial years (18 percent in 1990) is unlikely to exert much downward pressure even in 
competitive markets.  But the growth gap becomes more pronounced during the mature and 
backlash periods, when managed care penetration grew to an average of 42 percent in those low 
managed care markets.    It would appear that the persistent competition effect was initially the 
result of aggressive selective contracting in the high managed care market, but was later present 
in the less saturated but growing managed care markets that seem to catch up with the more 
highly penetrated and experienced markets.  
Besides the issues raised in the sensitivity analysis, there are two additional limitations to 
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our findings.  First, we cannot identify the sources of the apparent weakening of managed care in 
2003.  The backlash effect may include relaxation of utilization review, less aggressive selective 
contracting (possibly associated with broadening of provider networks), and/or a shift in 
enrollment away from HMOs, with greater cost control features, to PPOs.  We have some 
indirect evidence that the selective contract effect might dominate the utilization effect.  Model 3 
with interaction effects indicates that competition no longer matters in highly saturated managed 
care markets during the backlash period.  Since managed care plans have been shown to leverage 
competition among hospitals to negotiate contracts, the diminishing competition effect in these 
markets suggests a weakening of selective contracting.  Second, while our models takes into 
account hospital competition and local mergers and acquisitions, they do not fully capture the 
potential effects of multi-hospital systems formation among hospitals both within local markets 
and from different geographic regions.  Hence the competition measure is likely an 
underestimate of the true level of concentration in the current hospital market.  Further research 
should include a Herfindahl index that takes into account the non-local system membership as 
well as other measures to capture true system membership effects.  
Given our findings, the current trends of rising health care costs and expenditures are 
potentially troubling in the long run.  Our findings suggest that managed care, which had helped 
control rising health expenditures in the U.S. during much of the 1990’s, may have run its course 
in terms of its effectiveness in controlling health cost inflation.  If the observed weakening of 
managed care is due primarily to a pull back of selective contracting, utilization review, and 
HMO enrollment, it may be possible to reverse these policies if consumers are willing to accept 
these restrictions in return for slower rates of growth in health care inflation.  Alternatively, if it 
is due to other more structural factors, such as the formation of multi-hospital systems, then a 
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return to the boom period where managed care was more effective may not be possible.  
In the short run, current policies designed to move more Medicaid and Medicare 
populations into managed care plans would not have the desired cost saving effect.  However, it 
might have desirable effects on other aspects of care delivery.  Even though managed care plans 
may have cutback on their practices of utilization review and selective contracting, they are 
reportedly expanding on their disease management and preventive care services (Draper et al 
2002; Mays et al 2003).  A complete evaluation of the backlash effects necessarily involves an 
examination of many other aspects of the health care system, such as whether access to care and 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
    
 1990 1994 1998 2003 
Hospitals in high managed care 
penetration areas Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
System-wide managed care penetration 0.50 (0.12) 0.64 (0.12) 0.70 (0.09) 0.64 (0.04)
Herfindahl index 0.29 (0.12) 0.26 (0.09) 0.27 (0.09) 0.29 (0.09)
Medicare casemix index 1.31 (0.18) 1.35 (0.22) 1.40 (0.24) 1.38 (0.24)
Total discharges 8781 (6763) 8447 (7173) 9252 (7937) 11320 (8593)
Total outpatient visits 76155 (75877) 98045 (99949) 131798 (138167) 170546 (160221)
Wage index 1.23 (0.15) 1.03 (0.14) 1.06 (0.14) 1.04 (0.13)
Medicaid pressure index 0.75 (0.15) 0.63 (0.19) 0.60 (0.16) 0.69 (0.14)
Medicare pressure index 1.02 (0.18) 1.01 (0.20) 1.04 (0.21) 1.01 (0.20)
FP ownership 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) 0.18 (0.38)
GOV ownership 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.10 (0.30)
Belong to a system 0.50 (0.50) 0.57 (0.46) 0.70 (0.40) 0.80 (0.39)
County per capital income 19484 (3456) 22425 (4171) 28905 (6368) 33796 (7781)
% FP hospitals 0.17 (0.21) 0.13 (0.17) 0.13 (0.17) 0.13 (0.19)
% GOV hospitals 0.09 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 0.08 (0.12) 0.06 (0.11)
Number of hospitals   1129   1524   1305   930
Hospitals in low managed care 
penetration areas                 
System-wide managed care penetration 0.18 (0.05) 0.26 (0.06) 0.40 (0.07) 0.42 (0.08)
Herfindahl index 0.40 (0.10) 0.35 (0.08) 0.35 (0.09) 0.33 (0.11)
Medicare casemix index 1.28 (0.19) 1.31 (0.21) 1.39 (0.24) 1.39 (0.24)
Total discharges 8407 (6607) 7900 (6393) 8485 (7099) 10295 (8257)
Total outpatient visits 69090 (55482) 94866 (100760) 129391 (131670) 174627 (203710)
Wage index 1.09 (0.12) 0.88 (0.09) 0.90 (0.09) 0.97 (0.19)
Medicaid pressure index 0.80 (0.18) 0.72 (0.23) 0.73 (0.23) 0.72 (0.17)
Medicare pressure index 0.92 (0.11) 0.88 (0.12) 0.90 (0.12) 0.95 (0.22)
FP ownership 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39)
GOV ownership 0.15 (0.36) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
Belong to a system 0.40 (0.49) 0.47 (0.48) 0.66 (0.44) 0.79 (0.39)
County per capital income 16353 (2860) 18955 (3511) 23529 (4077) 28996 (13004)
% FP hospitals 0.12 (0.19) 0.10 (0.18) 0.12 (0.20) 0.11 (0.19)
% GOV hospitals 0.09 (0.16) 0.08 (0.15) 0.08 (0.15) 0.10 (0.16)
Number of hospitals   384   479   458   423
Note: Hospitals in medium managed care areas are omitted from this table. 
 
Table 2. Regression Results on Log of Operating Cost 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables Beta  SE Beta  SE Beta  SE 
Time dummies               
year 1994 0.452 ** 0.060 0.612 ** 0.154 0.274 ** 0.035 
year 1998 0.906 ** 0.095 1.448 ** 0.392 0.372 ** 0.051 
year 2003 0.918 ** 0.121 1.259 ** 0.395 0.560 ** 0.057 
Managed care effects             
log of MC penetration (MC) 0.003  0.018 -0.028  0.064      
MCX1994 -0.027 * 0.016 -0.075 * 0.040      
MCX1998 -0.090 ** 0.023 -0.228 ** 0.094      
MCX2003 -0.005  0.030 -0.090  0.097      
high MC         0.060 ** 0.029 
high MCX1994         -0.073 ** 0.029 
high MCX1998         -0.108 ** 0.033 
high MCX2003         -0.019  0.041 
med MC         0.033  0.036 
med MCX1994         -0.054  0.040 
med MCX1998         -0.087 ** 0.042 
med MCX2003         -0.003  0.049 
Competition effects             
log(HHI) -0.065 ** 0.031 -0.089 ** 0.031      
log(HHI)X1994 0.091 ** 0.023 0.066 ** 0.019      
log(HHI)X1998 0.170 ** 0.030 0.134 ** 0.029      
log(HHI)X2003 0.240 ** 0.028 0.226 ** 0.028      
Indicator for high HHI         -0.023  0.029 
high HHIX1994         0.005  0.030 
high HHIX1998         0.051  0.033 
high HHIX2003         0.151 ** 0.041 
Interaction between MC 
and competition effects      
   
    
high MCXhigh HHI         -0.074 ** 0.036 
high MCXhigh HHIX1994         0.075 ** 0.036 
high MCXhigh HHIX1998         0.066  0.041 
high MCXhigh HHIX2003         -0.013  0.050 
med MCXhigh HHI         -0.022  0.037 
med MCXhigh HHIX1994         0.016  0.040 
med MCXhigh HHIX1998         0.050  0.043 
med MCXhigh HHIX2003         -0.016  0.055 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 
Complete regression results continue on the next page 
Model 1: Actual managed care penetration rates over the years are used in the hospital fixed-
effects model 
Model 2: Instrumented managed care penetration rates are used in the hospital fixed-effects 
model, where historical managed care penetration rate (1987) were used to instrument for 
changes in managed care penetration rates. 
Model 3: Hospitals are classified into low, medium, and high managed care penetration areas 
based on actual managed care penetration rates in each year. 
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Table 2. Regression Results on Log of Operating Cost (Continue) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables Beta  SE Beta  SE Beta  SE 
Other control variables               
log(Medicare casemix 
index) 0.295 ** 0.089 0.263 ** 0.087 0.324 ** 0.088 
log(Medicare casemix 
index)2 -0.090  0.106 -0.095  0.115 -0.091  0.107 
log(total discharge) -0.065  0.172 -0.027  0.136 -0.091  0.163 
log(total discharge) 2 0.027 ** 0.010 0.025 ** 0.008 0.029 ** 0.010 
log (outpatient visits) -0.042  0.046 -0.024  0.049 -0.049  0.040 
log (outpatient visits) 2 0.006 ** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.006 ** 0.002 
log(wage index) 0.125  0.078 0.137 ** 0.067 0.111  0.084 
log(wage index) 2 -0.079  0.152 -0.266  0.165 0.081  0.204 
Medicaid pressure index -0.035  0.038 -0.054  0.039 -0.022  0.032 
Medicare pressure index 0.106  0.074 0.067  0.066 0.113  0.070 
FP ownership -0.030  0.024 -0.031  0.022 -0.031  0.025 
GOV ownership -0.059 ** 0.022 -0.053 ** 0.020 -0.070 ** 0.023 
System membership 0.012  0.008 0.011  0.007 0.011  0.008 
log(per capita income) 0.174 ** 0.080 0.170 ** 0.062 0.189 ** 0.095 
% FP in the market -0.003  0.041 -0.005  0.037 0.001  0.040 
% Gov in the market -0.081 ** 0.041 -0.075 ** 0.034 -0.106 ** 0.042 
constant term 13.176  1.159 13.718  0.986 13.095  1.189 
Number of observations     8236   8017     8281 
Number of hospitals     2727   2613     2736 
* p<0.10 **p<0.05 
Model 1: Actual managed care penetration rates over the years are used in the hospital fixed-
effects model 
Model 2: Instrumented managed care penetration rates are used in the hospital fixed-effects 
model, where historical managed care penetration rate (1987) were used to instrument for 
changes in managed care penetration rates. 
Model 3: Hospitals are classified into low, medium, and high managed care penetration areas 
based on actual managed care penetration rates in each year. 
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Table 3. Regression Results on Log of Patient Revenue 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables Beta  SE Beta  SE Beta  SE 
Time dummies               
year 1994 0.448 ** 0.073 0.615 ** 0.190 0.299 ** 0.039 
year 1998 0.905 ** 0.114 1.473 ** 0.471 0.346 ** 0.059 
year 2003 0.795 ** 0.168 1.337 ** 0.475 0.534 ** 0.065 
Managed care effects          
log of MC penetration (MC) -0.001  0.020 -0.045  0.078    
MCX1994 -0.022  0.018 -0.072  0.049    
MCX1998 -0.090 ** 0.028 -0.230 ** 0.111    
MCX2003 0.018  0.040 -0.117  0.113    
high MC       0.051  0.035 
high MCX1994       -0.082 ** 0.033 
high MCX1998       -0.111 ** 0.044 
high MCX2003       -0.018  0.049 
med MC       0.038  0.041 
med MCX1994       -0.076 * 0.043 
med MCX1998       -0.112 ** 0.050 
med MCX2003       -0.018  0.056 
Competition effects          
log(HHI) -0.070 ** 0.029 -0.102 ** 0.032    
log(HHI)X1994 0.090 ** 0.030 0.066 ** 0.029    
log(HHI)X1998 0.186 ** 0.036 0.160 ** 0.038    
log(HHI)X2003 0.231 ** 0.033 0.216 ** 0.039    
Indicator for high HHI       -0.027  0.035 
high HHIX1994       -0.006  0.034 
high HHIX1998       0.061  0.045 
high HHIX2003       0.128 ** 0.051 
Interaction between MC 
and competition effects 
         
high MCXhigh HHI       -0.064  0.041 
high MCXhigh HHIX1994       0.080 ** 0.041 
high MCXhigh HHIX1998       0.057  0.052 
high MCXhigh HHIX2003       0.001  0.059 
med MCXhigh HHI       -0.038  0.042 
med MCXhigh HHIX1994       0.053  0.044 
med MCXhigh HHIX1998       0.085  0.054 
med MCXhigh HHIX2003       0.059  0.065 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 
Complete regression results continue on the next page 
Model 1: Actual managed care penetration rates over the years are used in the hospital fixed-
effects model 
Model 2: Instrumented managed care penetration rates are used in the hospital fixed-effects 
model, where historical managed care penetration rate (1987) were used to instrument for 
changes in managed care penetration rates. 
Model 3: Hospitals are classified into low, medium, and high managed care penetration areas 
based on actual managed care penetration rates in each year. 
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Table 3. Regression Results on Log of Patient Revenue (Continue) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables Beta  SE Beta  SE Beta  SE 
Other control variables               
log(Medicare casemix 
index) 
0.381 ** 0.137 0.336 ** 0.129 0.414 ** 0.133 
log(Medicare casemix 
index)2
-0.220  0.148 -0.229  0.152 -0.227  0.148 
log(total discharge) 0.096  0.215 0.171  0.156 0.077  0.203 
log(total discharge) 2 0.021  0.013 0.017 * 0.010 0.022 * 0.012 
log (outpatient visits) -0.034  0.045 -0.027  0.047 -0.040  0.038 
log (outpatient visits) 2 0.006 ** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.006 ** 0.002 
log(wage index) 0.108  0.095 0.100  0.087 0.097  0.100 
log(wage index) 2 -0.078  0.179 -0.290  0.208 0.064  0.220 
Medicaid pressure index -0.064  0.048 -0.065  0.054 -0.046  0.044 
Medicare pressure index 0.191 ** 0.087 0.154 * 0.083 0.191 ** 0.081 
FP ownership 0.014  0.029 0.013  0.026 0.013  0.030 
GOV ownership -0.087 ** 0.026 -0.079 ** 0.025 -0.097 ** 0.027 
System membership 0.013  0.009 0.014 * 0.008 0.013  0.009 
log(per capita income) 0.192 ** 0.083 0.192 ** 0.064 0.219 ** 0.102 
% FP in the market 0.011  0.043 0.024  0.041 0.014  0.042 
% Gov in the market -0.063  0.042 -0.055  0.037 -0.085 * 0.043 
constant term 11.293  1.263 12.335  1.106 11.097  1.284 
Number of observations   8206   7986   8251 
Number of hospitals   2722   2608   2731 
* p<0.10 **p<0.05 
Model 1: Actual managed care penetration rates over the years are used in the hospital fixed-
effects model 
Model 2: Instrumented managed care penetration rates are used in the hospital fixed-effects 
model, where historical managed care penetration rate (1987) were used to instrument for 
changes in managed care penetration rates. 
Model 3: Hospitals are classified into low, medium, and high managed care penetration areas 
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Figure 1. Trend in Managed Care Penetration: 1990-2003
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Figure 2A. Unadjusted Trend in Log of Operating Cost 
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Figure 2B. Unadjusted Trend in Log of Patient Revenue 






















1990 1994 1998 2003
year
Assume all are in high MC area Assume all are in low MC area
























1990 1994 1998 2003
year
Assume all are in high MC area Assume all are in low MC area











1990 1994 1998 2003
year
High HHI Low HHI






1990 1994 1998 2003
year
High HHI Low HHI
Predicted log(cost) in low MC area








1990 1994 1998 2003
year
High HHI Low HHI






1990 1994 1998 2003
year
High HHI Low HHI
Predicted log(Revenue) in low MC area
Figure 4B. Competition Effects on Patient Revenue By Managed Care Levels
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